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Defining US Southeast Asia Strategy: 




Studi ini mengkaji strategi Amerika Serikat (AS) di Asia Tenggara (Asteng). 
Penulis secara khusus dan empiris mengambil fokus kepentingan-
kepentingan vital AS apa yang sesungguhnya terancam di kawasan 
Asteng, bagaimana berbagai strategi AS dan sumber daya yang 
dimilikinya melindungi dan memajukan kepentingan tersebut. Berbeda 
dengan studi lainnya, penulis mempertimbangkan apakah kebijakan 
poros strategis AS di Asia semata berfungsi untuk menjaga kohesivitas 
keamanan antarkawasan yang berada di bawah payung AS sejak 
Perang Dunia II. Kebijakan demikian dapat membelah persatuan ASEAN, 
menimbulkan ketegangan dengan Tiongkok, dan juga pada akhirnya 
dapat melemahkan keamanan antarkawasan. Sebagai tambahan, 
penulis mempertimbangkan apakah fokus baru AS di Asteng benar-
benar format baru atau sekedar perubahan fokus strategi dengan 
substansi yang sama. Dengan menggunakan analisa studi kasus tunggal 
dari politik luar negeri AS di bawah Pemerintahan Presiden Obama 
di Asteng dari tahun 2009-2012, penulis menemukan bukti bahwa 
asosiasi antara fokus baru AS di Asteng dengan kepentingan nasional 
AS di bidang ipoleksosbudhankam yang bersifat memaksa sebagai 
bagian politik luar negerinya yang digunakan untuk memperbaiki 
keadaan dalam negerinya. Selain itu, penulis menunjukkan bahwa 
politik luar negeri AS di Asteng tetap dilanjutkan fokusnya pada perang 
melawan terorisme, menahan kebangkitan Tiongkok, dan memastikan 
bahwa kawasan Asteng tidak didominasi oleh entitas kekuatan yang 
berpotensi memusuhi AS.
Kata kunci: Amerika Serikat, kebijakan luar negeri, Asia Tenggara, 
strategis.
Introduction
Southeast Asia (SEA) countries share strategic locations and access to plentiful 
natural resources. Furthermore, their diversity and increasing integration lie 
at the heart of the region’s rapid and resilient economic growth. Politically, in 
the post 1997-1998, the region provides stability in a part of the world that is 
rapidly reshaping the global balance of power.
Meanwhile, The United States (US) has been the guarantor of the SEA 
security through a ‘hub-and-spoke’ security system and the forward basing of 
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US forces in the region since 1945. SEA continues to retain its geopolitical and 
economics importance to US national interests and global strategy. However, 
in every US administration there is an option between change and continuity 
on the focus of strategy in SEA. This study analyzes which variables are likely 
to have an effect on the US and SEA strategy.
This study examines US foreign policy in the region from 2009-2012.  This 
study will discuss the question about what vital US interests really are at stake 
in the region, what is US strategy is, and what resources are used to protect 
and advance those interests. I will divide this study into three sections. The 
first section analyzes how the US security strategy contributes to its new focus 
in the SEA. The second section examines how economic strategy contributes 
to its strategic interests. The third section investigates how the US directed 
liberal internationalism values to shape the region.
Theoretical Framework
The discourses on order in the SEA and the role of the US are extensive and 
voluminous. One of the debates focused on what is the explanation of the 
US hegemonic project in the region post-Cold War security order and the 
potential durability of any US-centered order (Ikenberry & Matsanduno, 
2003). In this study I will focus on how US SEA strategy fits into this discourse. 
I will conduct a single-case study of US strategic pivot towards SEA under the 
Obama Administration from 2009-2012 which has the potential to play a role 
in the attenuation of regional security. In Regions and Power: the Structure of 
International Security, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003, p. 10-11) pointed 
out that “the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of 
conflict and cooperation for states. Regional security dynamics will normally 
be a significant part of the overall constellation of security in the international 
system.”
Kerry and Manning (2001), Misalucha, (2011)  and Park (2011)  pointed 
out that SEA remains important to US national security and continues to retain 
its geopolitical and economic importance to US national interests and global 
strategy. Yet, the US policy toward the region has been ad hoc, incoherent, 
reactive, and vague. Thus, in Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics 
and National Differences, Marc Beeson (2004) points out “the general point to 
emphasize about American power in the context of Southeast Asia is that it 
has resources available to it at the strategic, economic, and institutional levels 
that allow it to pursue its interests in ways that other countries cannot.” Now 
with the ‘Asia Pivot’,  as Ming-Te & Tai-Ling Liu (2011), Tow & Kurlantzick 
(2012) found that the most high profile and concrete elements of the Obama 
administration toward the region have come in the military realm, economic 
and trade relations, and sustain liberal internationalism value-making in 
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the region. In each of these analyses, it is clearly that there is significant 
evidence that the US is adopting a balancing strategy between intensifying 
its engagement and strategic commitment within the region. It also suggests 
SEA’s rising importance in international order. 
My research question is: “what vital interests really are at stake in SEA 
region today?” The study’s hypotheses may include the following: (1) the 
economic, political, security ties between the US and ASEAN are fundamental 
to US economic growth and security will lead to the new focus of US SEA 
strategy, (2) China’s emergence as a major regional power is transforming 
the economic, political, and security environment in SEA will lead to the new 
focus of US SEA strategy.
My first hypothesis pointed out by Ernest Bower and Murray Hiebert 
that the SEA region is an arena of considerable economic, geostrategic, and 
geopolitical interests that will lead to the new focus of US SEA strategy (2011: 
1-3). My second hypothesis outlined by Evelyn Goh and Sheldon Simon (2008) 
is that the economic and political rise of China influences the nations of SEA 
and potentially challenges the US-centered hegemonic order in SEA will lead 
to the new focus of US SEA strategy. 
The study’s dependent variable is the US strategic policy in the region. 
The strategic policy covers elements of economic, politics, and security policy 
which relate to the role of armed forces in international affairs. It also can be 
seen as an approach by the government to protect and to promote national 
interests in the international environment (Australian Department of Defence, 
1997). The strategic policy plays a decisive part in the military strategy against 
the adversary. It also can be seen as the broad scope of foreign policy. US 
foreign policy formulations are impacted heavily by political interest groups 
and the lobby, corporatocracy, institutional views of the US State Department 
and Pentagon Foreign Policy according to the Encyclopedia Britannica (2012) 
is “general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state 
in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is 
influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, 
or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs.
This study explores three independent variables: (1) security; (2) 
economy; and (3) values. Security was measured by the application of realist 
school theories of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging to be applied in the 
US and SEA security strategy. Balancing implies the forging of countervailing 
strength against status quo as a hegemonic power and challenger of 
threatening status quo. As has been shown (Arlidge, 2011 & Goh, 2005) 
balancing occurs when a group of weaker states decide to oppose influence 
and threat posed by a stronger state or grouping of states that is unacceptable 
to them. The objective is to make sure that no one power is predominant in 
the region. Bandwagoning, by contrast, occurs when a state choose to align 
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itself strategically with the threatening power in order to limit the hegemonic 
or threatening power. As Arlidge (2011) and Goh (2005) demonstrated, in 
bandwagoning with the dominant state, weaker state joining together to 
counter larger power that threatens them.
Hedging refers to taking action to ensure against undesirable outcomes, 
usually by cultivating a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to 
choose one side at the obvious expense of others. States applied hedging 
strategy not to antagonize major powers unless and until they directly 
threaten to national interests and national sovereignty. These are basically 
approaches to security centered on state survival in an anarchical world. 
Economic stakes are influenced by the growing importance of this region to 
the US. Security and economic stakes are influenced and shaped each other by 
setting ‘rules of the game’ in the region. This is how value stakes strategically 
avail and circulate US strategy in a smart power by carefully crafting security, 
economic, and values that is held to deserve in the region.
Security Stakes
The eleven countries in the SEA are complex. The countries comprising 
ASEAN have varied political systems, socio-cultural systems, and rates of 
economic development. However when it comes to the US security stakes in 
the region it is relatively simple and straightforward. The security connection 
between US and SEA nations for almost six decades is characterized as a hub-
and-spoke system. In this system, the US had perceived as the central of the 
security guarantor and the rest of SEA come under its proxy. However it is 
not simple to elaborate whether US security stakes in the region, because who 
counts as a security issue, who are we trying to secure, who or what are we 
trying to secure against, and how security to be achieved. 
The first stake is to control the transportation channel at Malacca in 
order to break Chinese “string of pearl” strategy. This strategy is applied in 
the name of freedom of navigation in the geo-strategic of Malacca strait as sea-
lanes for international shipment of East Asia’s (EA) hydrocarbon from Middle 
East. It is likely that this objective is accompanied by freedom of movement on 
US forces from the Western Pacific to Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.  
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Map 1. String of Pearl’ and Strategic chokepoints: straits of Malacca, Sunda, 
Lombok, Makassar, and sea-lanes passing the South China Sea (Spartly Islands). 
Source: http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/maps_images.html
The recent trends of US security commitments in the region can be 
measured from those objectives and geostrategic location of the region. The 
regions geographic location encompasses sea-lanes connecting the Indian 
Ocean to the Pacific Oceans, linking north-south routes between Australia 
and New Zealand to the countries of EA, and its strategic relevance for 
international security and commerce. From the above map, we can see clearly 
that the hydrocarbon pathway is needed by the energy hunger of EA and 
the US naval movement. Annually over 60,000 maritime traders transport 
about 40 per cent of the world’s trade goods and 80 per cent of EA’s oil 
through Malacca strait (Sotrey, 2008: 102-103). From the Strait of Hormuz 
the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) must pass the Malacca strait or if 
there is any crisis must navigate to Sunda, Lombok, or Makassar straits. It is 
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reasonable to say that maintaining freedom of navigation of these strategic 
waterways is everybody’s concern and objective. However, from the US 
military perspective, these sea-lanes are critically important.
According to Kuppuswamy (2004), Malacca strait is “situated between the 
coastline of Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore to the East and the Indonesian 
island of Sumatra to the West, extends 900 km from its widest point (about 
350 km between Northern Sumatra and Thailand) to its narrowest (less than 3 
km wide between southern Sumatra and Singapore).  At its shallowest, it has 
reported that the depth is just 25 meters. Any attempt conducted by a hostile 
power to control or interdict these sea-lanes can raise the stakes the battle of 
power in the name of freedom of navigation and protecting each national 
interest. The security implications will be too heavy if hostile power and 
disruption take place on it. Because of these security implications, the US is 
eager to internationalize the Malacca strait. This is done by bilateral approaches 
towards the littoral states of Malacca—among which are Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore—to prevent conventional and non-conventional threats.   
The second stake is to advance military reinforcements and deployments 
in the region. To achieve a stable region in SEA, US thinks that it is better to 
have military capabilities, its presence, and its proxy. It is because if there is 
any potential threat of China as a rising regional power or disruption from 
SEA countries, it will threaten US economy and security in a variety of ways.
The US’s pivotal role in the region highlights the importance of military 
ties with its traditional allies in the region, namely the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Singapore, and announced it as strategy of rebalancing. This strategy of 
rebalancing is basically a shift of US military focus in the world from the realm 
of frustration in Afghanistan and Iraq to prospective SEA. That is why the 
US needs to secure SEA sea-lanes. The US is seeking to increase its military 
presence by shifting 60 per cent of its navy ship to the Asia-Pacific (Porth, 
2007). The necessity to rebalance toward SEA will emphasize in existing 
traditional alliances, searching non-traditional alliances, secure strategic 
partnership, selling arms sales, and reinforcement of US military deployment 
in the region.  
The shift of American military could place SEA countries in a dilemma 
because SEA is eager to have Chinese money under the US security umbrella. 
The US tries to attract its non-traditional alliances in the region in order to 
help them feel secure with his growing military posture capabilities in Asia 
and not to bandwagon with China. The US does not want any rival within the 
region as the guarantor of peace and stability because of its vested interests. 
The US plans to deploy new missile defense can be seen from this context. The 
US anti-missile defense or powerful early warning radar known as X-band in 
Japan in 2006, could be placed in SEA in the near future.
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Map 2. US Plans New Asia Missile Defense 
Source: Adam Entous & Julian Barnes (2012, August 23). U.S. Plans New Asia Missile 
Defenses. Retrieved September 16, 2012, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577605591629039400.html#project%3D
ASIAMISSILE0823%26articleTabs%3Darticle.
As we can see on the map above, I think it is a tactical move from the US 
to put strategic weapon in Japan, as a buffer state, where they can intercept 
missiles from China or North Korea. This also can be seen as a kind of shrewd 
preparation if there is any crisis in the region. Australia or SEA certainly have 
a strategic location to launch an attack or as a logistical station if war is broke 
out.
If we see from a macro analysis, it is likely that the US would militarily 
deter China. It is not only about defining hierarchy or hegemony but it is 
about how to prolong assertiveness in the US-centered hegemonic order in 
the region, due to its relative decline of the US power perceived by others. 
By implication, it will have an impact, from micro analysis, on whether SEA 
countries pursue security strategy of balancing, hedging, bandwagoning, or 
positioning neutrality to deal with the rise of China. The US tries to re-engage 
with SEA and send a ‘warning signal’ to China. In other words, it is a soft 




Map 3. Selected 92.000 US troops deployments and plans 
Source: Mark Manyin, et al. (2012). Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s 
“Rebalancing” Towards Asia. Washington: Congressional Research Service, p. 3.
I argue that this move is threatening the region, because it is creating an 
insecure mentality in the region and a shared collective security dilemma in 
the region. Griffiths, O’Callaghan, and Roach (2008: 295) posited that security 
competition will lead super power, major powers, middle powers, and little 
powers in the region to ensure order and protection in an anarchical international 
system. If we examine the current state of the US alliances, partnership, and 
security cooperation, there are only three countries that support US military 
presence in the region and among them are the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Singapore. The Philippines has an alliance treaty with US in 1947, joint military 
exercises, and 142 US soldiers have stationed in the Philippines. Thailand has 
an alliance treaty with US in 1955, joint military exercises, contributed troops 
and support for US military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thailand 
has 142 of US soldiers stationed in the country. Singapore contributed troops 
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and supported US military operations in Afghanistan, participant in anti-
piracy operations in Malacca Strait, joint military exercises, and the country 
has 163 of US soldiers stationed (Dormandy, 2012).  Other countries among 
which conduct military exercises with the US military in the region include 
Malaysia and Cambodia, but it has a small US military presence. Vietnam 
has a statement of intent on military medical cooperation with US, signed 
in August 2011. Malaysia has allied with Australia, while Australia has 
allied with the US. Malaysia allows Australia to use their airbase station at 
Butterworth (White, 2012). Meanwhile, Indonesia has carried out 140 joint 
military exercises with the US in 2011. US has financed four reconnaissance 
radars along the Makassar Strait, and provided 19 patrol boats, and tactical 
communication in Jakarta in addition to the radar installations along the 
northern Sumatra coast (Yudhoyono, 2012 & Dormandy, 2012).
Based on the above map, we can see that there are 92,000 troops deployed 
and plans supported by the US in the strategic pivot toward Asia. US military 
placements all over the world number is about 255,000 troops. This strategy 
is more than re-balancing but it is crowding Asia-Pacific with US troops to be 
stationed.1 I argue this can destabilize the region and it can result a potential 
clash deduced form keen observation in six contemporaries of the US military 
active in the region.
First, the US were increasing military training to ASEAN countries. 
From the year 2000, the US has staged a number of joint military Cobra Gold 
exercises and drills with the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, and 
Malaysia (Kerry & Manning, 2011). The US applies the 'influence squadron' 
concept by dispatching small groups of lower capability ships to far-flung 
locations across the region, the US Navy can partner with more nations in 
maritime SEA than would be possible if its ships operate as part of a large 
task force (Denmark & Kliman, 2011). The US Navy will deploy its first littoral 
combat ship (LCS) in Singapore, beginning from the second quarter of 2013. 
Second, in the midst of SCS tension, in June 2012, the Philippines has allowed 
American troops, warships, and aircraft once again use their former naval 
and air facilities in Subic, Zambales, and in Clark field in Pampanga after 
twenty years being inactive (Laude, 2012).
1 This is a conservative figure. The US military has bases in 70 countries with 255,065 military 
personnel deployed worldwide. The US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that the US 
would movie its Navy fleet and military personnel by 60% into the Asia-Pacific region. It 
means there will be 153,039 military personnel will come to the region. See Jules Dufour. 
(2007, July 1). The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases. The Global Deployment of US Military 
Personnel. Retrieved July 8, 2012, from Global Research: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-
worldwide-network-of-us-military-bases/; David Alexander. (2012, February 6). Panetta: 
Majority of US Warship moving to Asia. Defense secretary provides first details of new strategy. 
Retrieved July 9, 2012, from MSNBC: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/47655768/ns/
world_news-asia_pacific/t/panetta-majority-us-warships-moving-asia/#.UHNaiK47qt8.
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Third, the US marine deployment and airbase in Darwin in 2012 will be 
upgraded for increasing US nuclear-armed warships and aircraft. Fourth, it is 
accompanied by plans for surveillance drone aircraft to operate from Cocos 
Islands. Fifth, in 2011, the volume of US overseas arms sales hit a record 
high of $66.3 billion, the lion’s share coming from the Asia-Pacific region (US 
Department of Defense, 2012). Sixth, the US has sought to return to U-tapao 
Air Base in the Thai eastern seaboard province or Kampung Som in Cambodia 
as part of its military buildup in the region.
The US security objectives for military deployments, strategic missile 
shield plan, and being targeted to China, are to assure the region and to 
bandwagon with the US. This implies that the blockade of EA’s vital sea 
passages through SEA region could cut off its access to oil and other natural 
resources and strangle its economy. In other words, the shift of US military 
could affect the peace and stability in the region if it tries to play the role 
of leadership adversary with China. Any wrong signals over SEA sea-lanes 
continued to South China Sea (SCS) will cause unrest in the region.
These developments likely are part of a broader US strategy of forging 
alliances and effective bases throughout the region aimed at surrounding 
China. The US repeatedly has announced that its national interest in the 
region to maintain peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom 
of navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the SCS. However, US 
reaction to the territorial dispute in the SCS is quite important. The US 
announced that they do not take a position on competing territorial claims but 
they attempt to be on the game and elevate the issue as international affairs. 
The idea of more formal code of conduct proposed by the US is criticized by 
the Chinese media who sees America’s “role as a sneaky trouble maker sitting 
behind some nations in the region and pulling strings (Xinhua, 2012). 
The third stake is to surround China. In the Cold War, the US government 
saw the containment of communism as a global task. Now this mentality is 
coming back. From the perspective of regional security complex (Buzan and 
Waever, 2003) after the Cold War in SEA, “conflict came in bipolarized form, 
thus attracted a relatively clear pattern of superpower intervention.” SEA 
became so heavily penetrated by the US and Chinese rivalry that its essential 
structure largely followed Cold War alignments. Moreover, any stability inside 
the SEA countries has serious spill-over consequence in the region because of 
this reason. This is also because the status quo of the US super power and the 
rising regional power of China that has penetrated the domestic affairs of SEA 
countries and it heavily affected and played a role in regional bipolarization 
of conflict.  However, this region tied together as united ASEAN, partly 
because of that rivalry in the Cold War and its ambiguous role of ASEAN 
played so aptly for ‘rowing between two rocks.’ It is why SEA was neither 
fully autonomous nor subordinated.  
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After the Cold War, the situation borne some resemblance to Cold 
War mechanisms but in more dramatic, subtle, and strategic ways. The US 
attempted to divide-and-rule of ASEAN unity in order to weaken China’s 
political, economic and security influences in the region. China ‘peaceful rice’ 
seen by the US as potential challenger for the US ‘return to Asia’ policy, at first 
in business and later in remaking the order. The US engagement policy seeks 
to develop closer political and economic ties with SEA countries and draw 
them into US’s sphere of influence. This can be seen from the US initiative to 
urge regional bloc ASEAN to form an united front on territorial dispute in 
the SCS.
In the new US strategic review (January 2012), it is clear that the US has 
anticipated this at the very beginning. The US perceived challenge posed 
by the rising China at very heart of America’s new defense strategy. The 
document carefully said that China is not destined to be an adversary. But 
it makes it clear the US is, nevertheless, about to retool its military to deter 
China, and if necessary, to confront it (US DoD, 2012). It is reasonable to say 
that the fundamental of the US national security policy vis-à-vis China in SEA 
is to check the latter increase with the former decline in the region. What is 
the indicator?
I will look into details in economic stakes analysis but it is suffice to say 
that China’s trade with ASEAN surpasses trade between the US and ASEAN 
since 2007. I would like to elaborate my argument that the US contemporary 
strategy divide-and-rule since the Obama Administration has conducted a 
bilateral approach rather than regional approach. This can be seen from 
eighteenth visit of the US President and Secretary of State from 2009-2012.
Barrack Obama’s Trip through the SEA region 2009-2012 
2009 
Date(s) Country Objectives 
November 14 Singapore The trip was the second stop on a 
four-nation tour of Asia. Obama 
was attending APEC Singapore 
2009 summit. He had bilateral 
talks with Singapore’s PM and 
Indonesia’s President.  
2010 
Date(s) Country Objectives 
November 9-10 Indonesia President Obama’s state visit to 
Jakarta, as part of a four-country 
tour of Asia. He signed the 
Comprehensive Partnership 













































Date(s) Country Objectives 
November 17-19 Cambodia, 
Myanmar, & 
Indonesia 
President Obama second visit to 
Indonesia. He attended the 
annually ASEAN Summit and 
the sixth East Asia Summit 
(EAS) in Bali. He had bilateral 
meetings with PM of Thailand, 
President of the Philippines, and 
President of Indonesia.  
 
Before that, President Obama 
went to Myanmar for six-hour 
trip to balance U.S praise for the 
government’s progress in 
shaking off military rule with 
pressure to complete the process 
of democratic reform 
 
President Obama arrived in 
Cambodia to criticize the 
country’s strongman leader on 
the issue of human rights during 
a tense meeting. 
Hillary Clinton’s trip through the SEA region 2009-2012 
2009 
Date(s) Country Objectives 
February 18 Indonesia Hillary Clinton made her first 
trip as a Secretary of State to 
Asia. Indonesia is her second 
destination. US pledged stronger 
ties with Jakarta.  
 
She reiterated that Islam, 
democracy, and modernity can 
thrive together. 
 
She discussed building ties on 
issues such as climate change, 
trade, security, and counter-
terrorism. 
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2010 
Date(s) Country Objectives 
July 22-23 Vietnam Hillary was in Vietnam to attend 
the 27-nation of ASEAN regional 
forum. She discussed military 
cooperation and forging better 
ties, pushed in part by mutual 
concerns over SCS issue, as well 
as desire to expand trade and 
investment.  
October 29-30 Vietnam The second visit of Hillary 
Clinton was just about three 
months. Hillary attended the 
EAS and hosted meeting with 
her counterparts in the Lower 
Mekong initiative (LMI). 
 
She also highlighted economic 
partnerships with Vietnam, 
speaking for human rights and 
religious freedom, and building 
multilateral cooperation with 
Asia.  
October 30-31 Cambodia She commits that the US will 
deepen partnership with 
Cambodia and aim to help its 
social and economic 
development, including the debt 
issue.  
November 1-2 Malaysia She discussed bilateral 
relationships (strategic 
cooperation), the role that 
Malaysia is playing in the Trans 
Pacific Partnership, and a new 
free trade agreement that will 
enhance market access.  
 
She also raised issues for the 
Malaysian government to 
support Afghanistan and the 
people there with training and 
medical service. 
















Date(s) Country Objectives 
November 30 – 
December 2 
Myanmar Hillary Clinton was the first 
secretary state to visit Myanmar 
since John Foster Dulles in 1955.  
 
The aim of the trip was to test 
what the true intentions of 
Myanmar regimes and whether 
there was any commitment to 
both economic and political 
reform.  US wanted to help 
Myanmar in the democratization 
process. 
November 15-16 Philippines Hillary came to commemorate 
60th anniversary of the US-
Philippines Mutual Defense 
Treaty. She also participated in a 
signing ceremony to launch the 
implementation phase of 
Partnership for Growth with the 
Philippines.  
November 16 Thailand Hillary underscored US’s strong 
alliance with Thailand. She also 
discussed shared interests and 
regional issues in advance of the 
EAS. 
November 17-19 Indonesia She attended EAS and the US 
ASEAN Leaders Meeting.  
2012 
Date(s) Country Objectives 
July 10-11 Vietnam 
Hillary promoted US investment 
and raising human rights 
concern. 
July 11 Laos 
This groundbreaking visit to 
Laos marked the first US 
Secretary of State in 57 years. 
Hillary discussed a variety of 
bilateral issues, including the 
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Sources: Collected from various sources in Jakarta Post, Xinhua, Global Times, and 
Guardian.
July 11-13 Cambodia 
Hillary chaired and attended 
ministerial events and 
participated in bilateral meetings 
with Cambodian officials. 
Region conferences included 
ARF, the EAS Summit Foreign 
Ministries Meeting, and the US-
ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conference.  She acted as a co-
chair in the LMI Ministerial.  
Clinton led US business 
representatives to Cambodia for 
ASEAN at the “Commitment to 
Connectivity-US ASEAN 
Business Forum” and delivered 
a keynote address on Gender 
Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment.  
September 3 Indonesia 
Hillary discussed various 
regional issues with senior 
officials of Indonesia, such as the 
SCS dispute. Clinton held talks 
with Indonesian Foreign Affairs 
Minister Marty Natalegawa on 
bilateral and global issues. 
Hillary Clinton visited the 
ASEAN Secretariat, emphasizing 
the US’ commitment to see 
ASEAN continuing its growth as 
a vibrant, open region that is 
committed to regional and 
global peace and prosperity. 
September 6 East Timor 
Hillary reemphasized US 
support for East Timor 
democratization and economic 
development. 
September 7 Brunei 
Hillary focused on the 
discussion of Brunei's 
chairmanship of the ASEAN 
regional bloc in 2013. 
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What assumptions can be made from above data? Apart from a divide-
and-rule strategy and SEA’s strategic sea lanes of communication there are 
at least eight objectives from above visits. One for sure is the reaffirmation 
of a US ‘pivotal’ role in the SEA. Hillary Clinton visited all eleven countries 
of SEA in three years. There is no doubt that the center of economic gravity 
now shifted to Asia. SEA has a strategic and vital role to play concerning this 
trend. The US wants to revive its economic weight and brake China’s in the 
region. The US pays more attention to Indonesia because it has an important 
role to play in the region as largest Muslim population in the world. It can 
be seen also as a sign of a new US policy towards the Muslim world and its 
engagement with SEA countries in general.  Second, it is a try-out for the US 
to critically think what choices be made in crafting its strategy for the SEA 
in the midst of the rising China. In my view, there are only three courses, 
whether the US hinges to recapitalize its forces in the region, encourage its 
allies to take on larger security responsibilities or limit its commitments.
Third, the US is encouraging the rise of SEA’s low and middle powers to 
hedging together as a unit against China. As for that case, ASEAN countries 
are in the dilemma of presenting themselves, not to leaning toward the US or 
China. ASEAN countries now are on the brink of this division if they cannot 
internally find solutions to break the ‘battle’ of regional leadership between 
the US and China. The US wants to tie the discourse to ASEAN’s elites and 
its decision-making that underlines the importance of American power in 
assuring the small countries of ASEAN to protect their interests in the realm 
of China’s rise. Fourth, encircling China is a major challenge for US-centered 
hegemonic order in the region. The US ‘pivot’ to Asia-Pacific envisages US 
leadership in shaping regionalism and its future now is being contested by 
China. 
Fifth, it also raises the importance of the Eastern flank of Indonesia in geo-
strategic importance. Eighty per cent of China’s oil imports still pass through 
the Malacca strait and this is why it is a vital choke-point. However, it seems 
the US has a contingency plan in the Eastern part of Indonesia when the crisis 
erupted.  Sixth, the US tries to assure SEA countries not to bandwagon with 
China. The US does not want any rival within the region as the guarantor of 
peace and stability, because it threatens its vested interest in the region.
Seventh, at the moment US conduct the primacy of military power 
rhetoric to demand security commitment of SEA countries (such as defeat 
global terrorism) and to have greater access to SEA markets. In other words, 
the use of military power is to maintain its dominance of SEA resources and 
to gain profit against China.  Eight, the US wants to reaffirm its presence and 
influence in the region, or at least to neutralize China in order to sustain the 
status quo. China’s desire to reduce US influence is an uneasy fact for the US. 
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The ‘battle’ of making order in Asia-Pacific rests on how the US continues and 
consolidates its current patterns of the US-hegemonic order.   
In my opinion, the key element concerning to the order in SEA is 
balancing of power. The concept of balancing of power used in SEA tends 
toward the common confusion between the power structure and policies 
or behavior designed to influence the structural outcome.2 The US strategic 
engagement in SEA is to maintain US presence based on treaty alliances. In 
SEA, there are only three countries producing this capability, such as Thailand 
(Manila Pact of the former SEATO in February 19, 1954 and designated as 
major Non-NATO ally since December 2003), the Philippines (with Mutual 
Defense Treaty in August 30, 1951 and major non-NATO ally since October 6, 
2003), and Singapore (Strategic Framework Agreement July 1, 2005) in a less 
rigid way (Clinton, 2010).
The US objective is not just to sustain the cooperation but also it aims to 
engage further so that the cooperation remain effective in a changing world. For 
these three countries, US engagement is viewed as essential action to maintain 
regional stability and it needs to continue to prosper this complicated strategic 
environment. However, Indonesia and Malaysia relations with US were not 
so close comparing to those three countries. Indonesia is being targeted as a 
crucial and potential key ally for the US during the Obama Administration 
since the signing of a bilateral strategic comprehensive partnership in 2010. 
As for CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam) countries, the US is 
competing hard with China to influence these countries that located in China’s 
backyard. Based on these analyses, the US security strategies in the region are 
inextricable with the US economic interests. In the following section, I will 
analyze what the US economic stakes in the region.
Economic Stakes
Washington and Beijing as the world’s two biggest economies compete in the 
Asia’s regional economy. In the article of Foreign Policy, Hillary Clinton stated 
that “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic 
and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Clinton (2011) 
posited that open markets in Asia provide the US with unprecedented 
opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. 
Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of 
American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.”3
2 Wiliam Tow & Amitav Acharya. (2007, December). Obstinate or obsolete? The US alliance 
structure in the Asia–Pacific. Retrieved October 10, 2012, from ANU: http://ips.cap.anu.edu.
au/ir/pubs/work_papers/07-4.pdf, pp. 6-37.
3  Hillary Clinton. (2011, November). America’s Pacific Century. Retrieved September 18, 2012, 
from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_
pacific_century?page=full. 
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The SEA region contains eleven independent countries: Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. All of these, with the exception of 
Timor-Leste, joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The objectives of ASEAN are to promote regional economic growth, political 
stability, social progress, and cultural developments in the SEA region. The 
characteristic of ASEAN is non-interference, respect sovereignty, based on a 
mutualistic symbiosis relationship, and does not intend to make defense or 
military alliances and common foreign policy. The SE region then is open to 
any non-hostile country that wants to cooperate peacefully.
The ASEAN region covers an area of 4.46 million square kilometers, 
with a population of approximately 598 million people (about 8.8% of the 
world population). In 2011, its combined nominal GDP had grown to $1.8 
trillion; despite this significant disparities still prevail across the region 
(ASEAN, 2011). Today, according to Nehru (2011), SEA is characterized by 
high economic growth in most countries and closer regional integration. 
SEA’s ten countries have combined GDP of $1.9 trillion (bigger than India), 
a population of almost 600 million people (nearly twice that of the U.S.), 
and an average per-capita income $3.0925 (near that of China). Over the last 
decade, the countries have averaged a growth rate of more than 5 percent per 
year (Budiman, 2008). Rasyid (2008) posited that if SEA were one country, it 
would be the world’s ninth largest economy. It would also be the most trade-
dependent, with a trade-to-GDP ratio in excess of 150 percent, and one of the 
world’s consistently good performers.
In the midst of US economies downturn, economic opportunities in SEA 
are too good to be left out. There are at least three objectives on US economic 
strategies in the region. First, renew domestic economic vigor. The IMF has 
announced that China will surpass the US economically in real terms in 
2016. The report brings new light to the US economic debates surrounding 
American debts, budget, government spending, investment, and the crisis of 
the US dollar. The report uses purchasing power and other factors to gauge 
economic growth. It measured what people earn and spend in real terms as 
opposed to measuring exchange and currency rates (Weisbrot 2011 & RT 
2012). This has shocked many who did not realize China was so close to 
surpassing the US.
According to the latest US Treasury’s figures, the total outstanding 
U.S. public debt hit $16 trillion, an increase of more than 5 trillion dollars 
compared to the level when Obama took office in 2009. The US has come too 
close to the legislative limit of the debt, which was set at a level slightly below 
$16.4 trillion. According to Vasspard (2012) “to date, the budget deficit in the 
U.S. is $ 1.2 trillion. It is clear that there is no money in the treasury to solve 
the problem and it is impossible to pay the huge debt of many years in one 
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fell swoop. One has to understand: reducing the deficit now means stopping 
all movement within the economy. For the global market, which can hardly 
move right now, it will be a stab in the back.”
ASEAN with a considerable population is a large market for American 
goods and services as well as an increasingly important US investments 
destination and sources of imports. SEA is a region likely to play a critical role 
in determining the future of Asia and whether the US can sustain itself as an 
Asia-Pacific power. The significance of the SEA for US interest is reflected by 
the trade amounts almost $200 billion annually, and US cumulative investment 
in the region is valued over $100 billion in 2011 (Mitchell & Harding, 2011, p. 
VI). Therefore, any form of invigorating economic relationship is welcomed 
by the US. In SEA, China’s increasing economic clout and political influence 
has pushed US to the side and the role of leading economic player is taken 
over by China (Rachmianto, 2011).
When we connect the security stakes with economic stakes, as Liming 
(2012), we found an interesting link that “the volume of U.S. overseas arms 
sales hit a record high of $66.3 billion, the lion’s share coming from the Asia-
Pacific region.” This is why US conducts joint military exercises and drills 
with SEA countries and its traditional allies in Northeast Asia such as Japan 
and South Korea.
A second goal is to become largest trading partner in the region. This 
strategy objective is to prevent the decline of US total trade with SEA and 
pave the way for US investment flooding into the region. The table below 
explains more about it.    
Table 2. ASEAN with Selected Trade Partners: Total Trade (in US$ million and 
percent share) from 2003-2010
Source: Data processed from ASEAN. (2012). ASEAN Community in Figures. (Jakarta: 
ASEAN Secretariat), p. 14-15.
 
Country 2003 (%) 2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 
Intra-ASEAN 206,732 (25.1) 470,112 (24.8) 376,1172 (24.5) 519,805 (25.4) 
China 59,637 (7.2) 196,884 (10.4) 178,190 (11.6) 232,013 (11.3) 
EU-27 102,767 (12.3) 101,683 (11.0) 208,291 (11.2) 208,585 (10.2) 
Japan 113,401 (13.8) 214,400 (11.3) 160,893 (10.5) 206,637 (10.1) 
USA 117,886 (14.3) 186,243 (9.8) 149,582 (9.7) 186,685 (9.1) 
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From the table above we can infer that China, EU-27 and the US continued 
to be ASEAN’s major trade partners. The US remained the fifth largest goods 
trading partner of the ASEAN. Trade values between the US and ASEAN 
amounted $186 billion in 2010. This put the US in fifth place or 9.1% share in 
total trade with ASEAN. In addition to increasing intra-ASEAN integration, 
China was the fastest growing trade partner, an upsurge of more than ten-
fold with ASEAN since the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Intra-ASEAN trade 
comprised one-fourth of ASEAN’s total trade. China, EU-27, Japan, and the 
US continued to be the four major trade partners of the ASEAN.  However, the 
combined share of EU-27, Japan, and US to ASEAN’s total trade has dwindled 
from 2003-2010. 
ASEAN is also a major destination for American foreign investments, 
as measured by Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) position as we can see 
from the table below. From the table below, EU-27, intra-ASEAN and Japan 
remained to be the top providers of ASEAN FDI inflows for 2010. EU-27 
contributed 22.4%, followed by intra-ASEAN (16%), and Japan (11%). The US 
remained as the third largest investor in ASEAN in front of China by almost 
triple. Furthermore, according to the latest figures, in 2011 trade between 
US and ASEAN totaled $194 billion while China’s trade value with ASEAN 
amounted to $292.78 billion. US FDI stock in ASEAN countries amounted to 
$6.1 billion in 2011 while China’s investment in ASEAN totaled $4.38 billion 
in 2010.4 China is still the biggest trading partner for ASEAN, followed by 
EU, Japan, and the US. These figures have confronted SEA countries with an 
acute dilemma. It has historically a closed economic, strategic, and military 
ties with the US yet it is increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. 
China has definitely realized that it depends heavily on its trade, particularly 
the trade with its backyard neighbors in SEA to secure its imports of energy 
resources and other raw material that passed through SEA countries.
4 ASEAN. (2012, June). Overview of ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations. Retrieved September 12, 
2012, from Association of Southeast Asian Nations: http://www.aseansec.org/23222.
htm; Xinhua. (2011, November 17). China-ASEAN 2011 trade to hit record high. Retrieved 
September 14, 2012, from Xinhua: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-11/17/
content_14113326.htm.
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Table 3. ASEAN: FDI inflow, by source country (in US$ million) from 2003-2010 
and % share from 2003-2010
 
Source: ASEAN. (2012: 38). ASEAN Community in Figures. (Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat). 
The other side of coin, I think it is reasonable to say that the US wants 
to get more share in economic opportunities in SEA and if it possible to 
weaken China and ASEAN economic relations. Actually, since 2007 the total 
trade between China and ASEAN has surpassed total trade between US and 
ASEAN.5 This is why the US wants to catch-up with economic opportunities 
because it already lags behind in economic regional initiatives behind China 
such as ASEAN-China Free Trade Are (ACTFA) and ASEAN +3 cooperative 
frameworks. China’s initiative for an FTA with ASEAN formed the largest 
FTA, comprising 1.9 billion consumers and $4.3 trillion in trade (come into 
effect in 2010). 
With this profit, China has increased its military spending by 170% in 
real terms since 2002. The US remains by far the biggest military spender, 
with the defense budget of $711 billion in 2011. It is followed by China, which 
spent an estimated $143 billion on its armed forces in 2011 (Rogers, 2012). 
The US determines to reestablish the economic supremacy which cannot 
be challenged by China or by other combination of economic powers. The 
US wants to break any block of regional cooperation that is under Chinese 
influence and transform it to another kind of regional cooperation which is 
called “multilateral regionalism.”
The third goal is to craft economic “multilateral regionalism” to mitigate 
Chinese economic preponderance in the region. In general, it is about how 
to advance and promote US national interest in trade, credit, and natural 
resources one step ahead of China. The US lags behind China in projects on 
of its economic statecraft in the region. The US has started to realize that the 
table is difficult to turn and it is more reasonable for the US to advocate a new 
5 ASEAN. (2011, December 16). Inaugural China-ASEAN Beijing Economic Forum (CABEF) 
looks forward to its second edition in 2012, as organisers and participants affirmed the importance 
of bilateral dynamics. Retrieved 15 September, 2012, from Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations: http://www.aseansec.org/26758.htm.
Country 2003 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % Share 
EU-27 6,866 13,387 18,611 7,010 9,132 17,066 22.4 
Intra-ASEAN 2,712 7,876 9,626 9,449 5,271 1,765 16.1 
US 1,363 3,041 8,340 3,518 4,087 8,578 11.3 
Japan 3,903 10,413 8,844 4,129 3,763 8,386 11.0 




regionalism partnership to counter Chinese economic advancements in the 
region.  What is the form of this “multilateral regionalism?”
The form of multilateral regionalism is Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
The objective is to reach SEA countries such as Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, 
and Malaysia. According to Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu (2011, 
p. 108), the TPP is “basically follows Washington’s long term conception 
for regionalization in Asia that is centered on APEC countries towards 
trade liberalization in the region. Washington’s TPP proposal brings in yet 
another alternative to the multiple developments towards regionalization in 
Asia, which is currently centered on ASEAN +3 with China as the dominant 
player.”
This is the counter-economic strategy from the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Agreement (ACTFA), proposed China-oriented ASEAN +3 trade agreements 
or the broader Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia. This new 
economic cooperation initiative likely represents a pan-Asian movement to 
resist American imposition of liberal capitalist reforms and to restore Asia’s 
developmental vision. ACTFA itself was signed in 2002 and establishing the 
FTA in order to trade goods for the original six ASEAN countries in 2010 and 
for newer members by 2015 (Sutter, 2010, p. 217).
In my opinion, this happened likely because the US wants to be a model 
of regional architecture building in the region. The US tries to pave the way 
in economic regional architecture within ASEAN and their economic strategy 
in the region. The national security strategy is most likely aimed at economic 
regionalism connecting ASEAN with APEC and other regional institutions 
in the Asia-Pacific region (Clinton, 2010). By effect, it will create systemic 
concerns of a ‘noodle-bowl’ effect, which is the overlapping and crisscrossing 
of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region.
Following the Asian financial crisis, a variety of Asian regional 
multilateral groupings centered on ASEAN and its EA partners were formed 
and advanced significantly. China’s stature and influence in these groups 
and among ASEAN states grew rapidly and burgeoning intra-Asian trade 
and investment networks involving China in a central role, attentive, and 
innovative of Chinese diplomacy (Sutter, 209). This is known as the Beijing 
Consensus in opposition of Washington Consensus.
What is the impact of this so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’ for SEA? It 
is basically the consciousness of Asian in general, and SEA in particular 
(especially shown by the Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad) 
that the ability of print currency gives the US immense power. Why this is so 
importance?
It is because, “Chinese currency now has the potential to be a major 
currency of the global economy due to China’s huge international reserves 
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of as much $3 trillion” (The Nation, 2012). According to John Perkins (2004, p. 
212), it means that “US can continue to make loans that will never be repaid, 
and by that continues accumulate huge debts. As long as the world accepts 
the dollar as its standard currency, this excessive debt does not pose a serious 
obstacle to the corporatocracy. However, if another currency should come 
along to replace the dollar, and if some of the US’s creditors (Japan or China, 
for example) should decide to call their debts, the situation would change 
drastically. The US would suddenly find itself in a most precarious situation.” 
The US does not want that to happen and it is imperative to setting the values 
in the region.
Value Stakes
The first goal is to promote deeper liberal internationalism. According to 
Griffiths, O’Callaghan, & Roach (2008), liberal internationalism is “essentially 
a project to transform international relations so that they conform to models of 
peace, freedom, and prosperity allegedly enjoyed within constitutional liberal 
democracies such as the US”. Keohane (2002) posited that there are three 
strands of liberal internationalism, which are commercial liberalism operating 
at the transnational level, republican liberalism directed at the relationship 
between states and their citizens, and regulatory or institutional liberalism 
operates at the level of the international political structure. The US realized 
that it is important to build international regimes to expect desirable outcomes 
and behavior of ASEAN countries via embedded institution and bilateral ties. 
This is important task to illuminate economic and power relationship between 
states. Regimes according to Stephen Krasner (1982) can be defined “as sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.” By setting out the regimes, the US molds the international structure 
and system governed in the region by the infusion of principles, norms, rules, 
and decision making-procedures as sets of governing arrangements. This will 
create asymmetrical relationship and the power-maximizing of US interests 
in the region.   
With a US proactive policy towards the region, there is a basic value-
stake strategy from the US to the SEA countries to promote democratic 
development of the region, to invigorate engagement with its non-traditional 
allies, and to enhance its engagement with its traditional allies, and to address 
transnational threats in the region. In order to achieve those value-stake 
objectives, the US has to shape regimes in SEA to secure desired outcomes 
based on expected behavior. This is why values are so important because it 
is part of utilization of regimes in the practice and inextricably linked with 
expected behavior. Assuring these regimes will lead to power stability and 
interest security in the region. 
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Scholars of varying ideological persuasions agree that a strong state/
political economy are no longer viable in SEA, as the pressures of globalization 
continue to sweep the region shaking economies, and liberal economic rules 
are more rigorously enforced by international institutions like the IMF and 
WTO (Felker, 2004: 70). It seems that the advent of financial globalization under 
the auspices of undisguised American hegemony confronts the region with a 
stark choice: yield fully to the imperatives of global markets and to embrace 
economic as well as political liberalization, or else risk marginalization and 
decline.
During the Asian Financial Crisis, the US insisted on pressing neoliberal 
reforms through the conditions attached to IMF bailout packages. As of 
today, America has restored geostrategic priorities to prominence in its Asian 
agenda, at the expense of hopes for liberal political and economic change. 
Against the backdrop, of its regional rivalry with China and its pivot toward 
Asia, Obama Administration has sought greater security cooperation in the 
region and signalled its willingness to overlook differences in other policy 
areas, such as human rights and democratization. This is similar to what the 
second Bush Administration has done.
The US has pursued its foreign and security policy by proxy. It is done 
by building institutions domestically or through international institutions 
based on principal values of liberal internationalism (Arlidge, 2011; Goh, 
2005). With this involvement, the US has an influence in ASEAN’s regional 
approaches to foreign and security policy. This is the explanation why 
ASEAN was in a deadlock situation without any accepted communiqué for 
the first time in its 45-years history in ASEAN’s 2012 summit in Cambodia 
(Saragih, 2012). The region was divided whether to support US or China in 
deciding the substantial and acceptable solution for SCS dispute. China is 
deeply influencing Cambodia while other states have deeply embedded in 
the US security area through a hub-and-spoke system.
Second, is to spread democracy and human rights. Advancing democracy 
and human rights is the central pillar of US engagement throughout SEA. The 
US is ensuring wide dissemination of these ideas through elite accommodation 
and institutional crafting of plural society in the SEA democratization 
(US National Intelligence Council, 2004: 43). The utilization of liberal 
internationalism by the US was mainly done by promoting democracy and 
pressing human rights issues as ‘the only game in the town’.  If not, there 
will be attempt to overthrow the independent political order by hook or by 
crook. New international forces, whether taking the form of demands by 
donor countries for human rights, global capitalism’s structural requirements 
for meritorious selection and consumerism, NGOs or the media’s advocacy, 
appear recently to have combined in ways that promote democracy’s liberal 
dimensions.
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In my view, democracy and human rights are commonly accepted in 
the region as ideal condition that meets the level of civil, political liberties 
and rights sufficiently to ensure the integrity of political competition and 
participation. However, these ideas often have been implemented in different 
nomenclatures because of the bitter colonial experience and the idea of political 
culture. O’Neil (2010: 115) posited that political culture is “essentially the 
argument that there are differences in societal institutions-norms and values-
that shape the landscape of political activity.” Because of their background in a 
protracted and often conflictual process of decolonization the regional security 
complex in SEA shaped by a mixture of acceptance for liberal democracy. 
The West’s imperial quest for resources and its intense colonization in the 
region have made negative image in the people. It should be noted also that 
there are various styles of democracy in the region, for instance in Indonesia 
and Malaysia there is gotong royong concept which is spirit of mutual help in 
society.
Any attempt to push singular democratization to the region is actually 
counterproductive, because the developmental challenges in the SEA region 
are wide and varied. The countries comprising ASEAN have varied political 
systems, socio-cultural systems, and rates of economic developments. If 
the US wants to sustain its hegemonic project in the region then it is must 
pay attention to these considerations. By and large, this is what the Obama 
Administration learnt from the previous administration especially dealing 
with of so-called “Islamic terrorism” in the region. Terrorism is a clear threat 
for the US to preserve its centered order in the region.
Third, the Obama Administration wants to prevent latent threats such as 
terrorism coming to the surface. The objective of the Obama Administration 
to the Islamic world is to reshape the negative image of Bush’s unilateral and 
neo-conservative policy. In the SEA region it added with not to bandwagon 
with China.  
In the context of SEA, it is difficult to achieve because of negative civic 
consent of US ‘contemporary legacy of empire’ in Muslim countries, such 
as the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003, war in Afghanistan 2001, and the US 
staunch support for Israel against the Palestinian cause. As with many other 
Muslims in the world, SEA’s Muslims were not happy with terrorist stigmas 
produced by counterterrorism and the deradicalization policies of Bush’s 
Administration. And this is exactly what Obama Administration is trying to 
reshape to end years of mistrust between the West and the Muslim world 
with his first visit to Indonesia in 2010 (Jakarta Post, 2010; Guardian, 2010). 
However, the presence reality suggests the opposite direction in President 
Obama’s rhetoric. Apparently he still commits to use American military in his 
foreign policy objectives.
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Obama’s doctrine is basically a far more focused approach to US 
adversaries; a shift from the martial policies and bellicose rhetoric of the Bush 
administration. The Bush doctrine was basically a principle of sustaining a 
global Pax Americana with the strategy of pre-emptive strikes against threats 
to US national security. It is a global battle against terrorist in his words “either 
you are with us or against us” (BBC, 2002).
Therefore, the US SEA strategy is likely a continuation of Bush’s policy 
in a more subtle way, yet at same shifting focus to restrain China by forging 
alliances in the region. Keating (2007) posited that the US strategy issued by the 
US Pacific Command (PACOM) in November 2008 is based on “partnership 
and military readiness.” In Bush’s era it was more assertive but in Obama’s 
era it is apparently deceptive in downplaying the military preeminence at 
least on the half of his administration. In fact, it has changed drastically from 
2012 where US Marines were set for Darwin deployment (Siegel, 2012). If in 
Bush’s Administration the US is seeking to root out non-traditional security 
threats via cooperative security. In the Obama’s Administration, it is seeking 
to root out traditional and non-traditional security threats to advance its 
national interests. For instance, from 2005, the US has a ministerial dialogue 
with SEA to discuss mainly terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
proliferation, and preparation for possible pandemics (Sheldon, 20121: 6).
America’s interests are inextricably linked to the durability of US-centered 
order. In the US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) 2010 (US DoD, 2010: 
59), the US military objective is to “enhance our long-standing alliances with 
Thailand and the Philippines, to deepen our partnership with Singapore, and 
to develop new strategic relationship with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, 
to address issues such as counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and to support 
humanitarian assistance operations in the region. The United States is also 
encouraging the continued development of multilateral institutions and other 
integrated approaches to regional security affairs.”
Furthermore, it is noted in the QDR 2011 (US DoD, 2010: 10) that 
“whenever possible, the United States will use force in an internationally 
sanctioned coalition with allies, international regional organizations, and 
like-minded nations committed to these common principles. America’s 
Armed Forces will retain the ability to act unilaterally and decisively when 
appropriate, maintaining joint, all-domain military capabilities that can 
prevail across a wide range of contingencies.” Obama and his senior officials 
have successfully reframed Bush’s global battle as a more narrowly focused 
struggle against al Qaeda in a decisive ways. They stopped using the term of 
global war on terror and instead described it as a campaign against a single, 
clearly identifiable group (Rohde, 2012). It seems the strategy put importance 
on the continuation of Bush doctrine, but with more caution and a ‘not alone’ 
approaches (Richter, 2012).
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The recent upsurge of terrorism reminds the US that any ambitious project 
of liberalism will create a backlash to US national interest and degenerate 
the liberal system in international political economy. This is why the US has 
to show more cautious action, respect the interests of other countries or not 
trying to enforce it by committing more strongly to underpinning a liberal 
economic system with bilateral means and regional or multilateral institutions 
supported by coercive power. 
Conclusion
US strategy in SEA is the part of US reengagement in Asia strategy, knowing 
that it is a region that shapes the future of the stability of the region and for the 
entire world. The US vital interests in SEA are rooted in military, economic, 
and value stakes. It is basically built upon partnership with military pre-
eminence. The US SEA strategy is basically defined in two approaches. First, 
it is by commitment focusing more regional development mostly via bilateral 
ties and second, and it is done by advancing its strategic policy to contain 
China in the region. The US sees China’s rising prominence would steer 
the region in the direction that reduces American influence and against US 
interests.  It is about the fundamental cooperation sustained by inoculation of 
regimes and sustained by military supports to mitigate situations that could 
lead to conflict and crisis.
Many aspects of US policy towards SEA correspond to previous 
administration, e.g. Bush’s administration. The difference from the latter to the 
previous administration is the focus of Bush’s administration more aggressive 
and solitary one.  Obama’s foreign policy is more gradualist, sociable, and 
impulsive foreign policy. The strategic orientation is still the same by using 
hard power to pursue its objectives. In other words, the mentality of either 
“you with us or against us” is still prevalence. US exceptionalism, secularism, 
and military intervention in internal conflicts of other countries have become 
common words for the US. The US in SEA does not lack perception or native 
wit to pursue the same objective at the same moment. Obama’s administration 
crafted strategy to press SEA countries not to bandwagon with China while 
they are still encouraged to strengthening economic ties. At the same time, 
Obama’s administration keeps containing China with military expansion in 
the region.
Policy recommendation from this study relates to the will of foreign 
policy of Indonesian government to pursue its national interest assertively 
but wisely. Indonesia must ensure that any attempt to dictate the legitimate 
Indonesian government in controlling the political and economic order in 
Indonesia will be counterproductive. Based upon free and active foreign policy 
principles, Indonesia is willing to cooperate with any countries on equal basis. 
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Indonesia should condemn any attempt conducted by any country or any who 
is trying to enforce its will by hook or by crook. Last but not least, Indonesia 
should alert and expand its ideology, politics, economy, society, culture, and 
defence and security policy in deterring challenges, obstacles, threats, and 
harassments internationally or domestically, directly or indirectly by proxy 
war or asymmetric warfare. l  
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